Abstract: A two-house legislature can often be modelled as a proper simple game whose outcome depends on whether a coalition wins, blocks or loses in two smaller proper simple games. It is shown that there are exactly …ve ways to combine the smaller games into a larger one. This paper focuses on one of the rules, lexicographic composition, where a coalition wins in G 1 ) G 2 when it either wins in G 1 , or blocks in G 1 and wins in G 2 . It is the most decisive of the …ve. A lexicographically decomposable game is one that can be represented in this way using components whose player sets partition the whole set. Games with veto players are not decomposable, and anonymous games are decomposable if and only if they are decisive and have two or more players. If a player's bene…t is assessed by any semi-value, then for two isomorphic games a player is better o¤ from having a role in the …rst game than having the same role in the second. Lexicographic decomposability is sometimes compatible with equality of roles. A relaxation of it is suggested for its practical bene…ts.
partition the player set of the larger one. Section 5 lists the smallest decomposable games, and Section 6 gives some conditions guaranteeing or precluding decomposability. Section 7 considers whether lexicographic composition is compatible with equality, interpreted here as anonymity, i.e., all players having the same abstract role. The section presents some ways to generate LD games that are anonymous, and are both anonymous overall with anonymous components. Section 8 discusses a weakening of the lexicographic rule that is in actual use.
Section 2. De…nitions and examples
Let P be an in…nite set called the players, whose subsets are called coalitions. A simple game G is a set of coalitions such that:
(1) S 2 G and S S 0 imply S 0 2 G (monotonicity);
(2) the set of minimal coalitions of G is non-empty and …nite; (3) every minimal coalition is non-empty and …nite. A simple game will be called just a game and its minimal coalitions are its minimal winning coalitions, M (G). Thanks to monotonicity the latter de…ne the game. Thus f12; 13; 23g + speci…es a game in which the minimal winning coalitions are 12, 13 and 23, where "12"is an abbreviation for the coalition f1; 2g, etc., and where f12; 13; 23g + is the set comprising the listed coalitions plus all their supersets with respect to P. Four examples of non-games are: the empty set of no coalitions, which is excluded by condition (2); the set of all coalitions, which is excluded by condition (3) since its minimal coalition is the empty coalition; the set f12; 13; 14; :::g + ; which is excluded by condition (2); and the set fS : S is …niteg (where S designates PnS.) Although winning coalitions of in…nite size are quite valid, the last example has no minimal winning coalitions and so violates condition (2). The coalitions in the set B(G) = fS : S; S = 2 Gg are called the blocking coalitions of G. Thus a coalition is blocking when neither it nor its complement win. A coalition loses if it does not win or block. Those players who appear in some minimal winning coalition are designated P (G) and called the players of G: For an arbitrary game P (G i ) will be designated P i ; and #P i will be n i . It is useful to have notation for sets of coalitions that contain only players of G, so we let b G = fS : S P (G) & S 2 Gg and b B(G) = fS : S P (G) & S 2 B(G)g. In contrast to G and B(G), these are …nite. For an arbitrary game G i , the sets B(G i ) and b B(G i ) will be abbreviated B i and b B i . A veto player is one who is in all of G's coalitions. A game is proper if S; S 0 2 G implies S \ S 0 6 = , that is, if two disjoint coalitions cannot both win. The set of proper simple games is denoted G P r . (Although improper games are useful, the games discussed here will all be proper.) A decisive game is a proper game with B(G) = : The product of two games is the game G 1 \ G 2 and the sum is G 1 [ G 2 . An automorphism of a game G is a permutation of P (G) that leaves G invariant. A game G is anonymous if for every i; j 2 P (G) it has an automorphism mapping i into j. Anonymity is weaker than player symmetry, which requires that every permutation of P (G) be an automorphism. For example, the game whose players are the vertices of a pentagon and whose minimal winning coalitions are three players in a sequence is anonymous but not symmetrical since only some player triples can win. Games G 1 and G 2 are isomorphic if there is a bijection f :
and such a bijection is called an isomorphism of the games.
Given proper games G 1 and G 2 ; their lexicographic composition
, so that a coalition wins in it if it either wins in G 1 , or blocks in G 1 and wins in G 2 . (The next section will show that G 1 ) G 2 is itself a proper game.) A game G is said to be lexicographically decomposable (LD) if there exist games
Any decisive game G can be written G ) G 2 , but that does not constitute decomposability because the player sets do not partition P . A valid example is a two-party negotiation where a disagreement sends the issue to an arbitrator. The …rst game is f12g + , two negotiators following the unanimity rule, and the second is the single-player unanimity game f3g + . Their composition is the 2-of-3 majority game, and thus f12; 13; 23g 
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A non-decisive symmetrical majority game, e.g., one requiring 5 votes out of 7, is not LD. This can be seen by supposing the game has such a representation and choosing S as a minimal winning coalition in G 1 . Construct S 0 by replacing one member of S by a player from G 2 : Since S wins in G, S and S 0 are of equal size and the game is symmetrical, then S 0 wins in G. However, since S 0 does not win in G 1 it must block in G 1 ; and its new player must win alone in G 2 . However this implies that G is decisive, contrary to the premise. Non-decomposability holds not just for non-decisive symmetrical games but for all non-decisive anonymous games, as shown in Theorem 6. Another non-LD rule is the United Nations Security Council whose minimal winning coalitions have all 5 permanent members along with exactly 4 out of the 10 non-permanent ones. According to Theorem 4, the existence of a veto player precludes a decomposition. The reason, roughly put, is that if the second game becomes relevant, the overall outcome will depend on whether the …rst game was blocked by a veto player or by a group of non-veto players, but in lexicographic compositions the details of how the …rst game was blocked are irrelevant when the decision passes to the second. Section 3. Basic properties and the …ve rules of composition
is identical to G 1 and the claim follows. If G 1 is non-decisive, then G satis…es the non-emptiness condition for a simple game since it is a superset of G 1 . The monotonicity condition, that for S 2 G and S S 0 ; S 0 2 G, holds since every superset of a blocking set in G 1 is either blocking or winning in G 1 , and every superset of a winning set in G 2 is winning in G 2 . Properness requires that every pair S; S 0 2 G intersect. If both coalitions are in G 1 or both in G 2 this is true since these games are proper, and if S 2 G 1 and S 0 2 G 2 , then since S 0 wins in G it blocks in G 1 and intersects all of that game's winning coalitions.
This follows directly from the de…nition of composition. Note that the blocking coalitions are the same as for the sum game G 1 [ G 2 : Theorem 1. The following two propositions are equivalent (1) The binary operator , from G P r G P r to G P r , is such that whether S wins in G 1 G 2 depends only on whether S wins, blocks, or loses in G 1 and G 2 . (2) G 1 G 2 is one of the following:
in which a coalition wins by winning in more component games than its complement; (iv) the veto rule
) in which a coalition wins by winning in the …rst component game and not losing in the second, (or its reversal
Proof: To show that (2) is su¢ cient for (1) note that the rules listed depend are functions of membership in B i and G i and so depend only on whether a coalition wins, blocks or loses in each component. Proposition 1 stated that the lexicographic rule yields a proper game and the same can be shown in a analogous way for the other rules.
To show that (1) implies (2) note that any such operator can be depicted as in Figure  1 , left, whose cells show the outcomes for G 1 G 2 for all possible outcomes in the components. The possible outcomes, a coalition winning, blocking or losing are designated W; B; and L (which here stand for events rather than sets of coalitions.) The diagonal cells must have the values shown: the W W cell must be W by the …rst and second conditions of the de…nition of a simple game; the L L cell must be L because of the …rst and third conditions of the de…nition; and the B B cell must be B since otherwise the substitution of S for S would show that the composition game is improper. The o¤-diagonal cells are subject to the following restrictions, which are generated by switching S and S: if a (respectively b; c) is
These considerations imply that an operator is fully speci…ed by the values of a; b, and c. The next step is to show that the monotonicity of the game G 1 G 2 implies that those values are ordered as in Figure 1 (left), where an arrow a ! b indicates that a is equal to or higher than b and where it is taken that a W is higher than a B is higher than an L. The arrow indicating that "B"be equal to or higher than "c"will be derived as an example. An example of an operator that violates it has c = W and therefore d = L as in Figure 1 (right). Choose G 1 and G 2 as non-decisive games with disjoint player sets and choose S as a coalition that blocks in both. By the table S blocks in G 1 G 2 . The coalition S [ P (G 2 ) blocks in G 1 and wins in G 2 . It must block or win in G 1 G 2 since it is a superset of S and G 1 G 2 ; as a game, is monotonic, but the table assigns L to the B W cell. The con…guration of Figure 1 (right) is thus impossible. Similar arguments can be made for the other three arrows.
There are exactly eight orders consistent with the partial order in Figure 1 . This can be established by constructing a tree where the possiblilities for a branch to the possibilities for b, etc. The result is the …ve rules and their three reversals.
Their tables are shown below, where the tables of the reversals of the lexicographic, degenerate and veto rules are understood as the transposes.
One composition rule is said to be more decisive than another if the set of coalitions that win under the former are a superset of those that win under the latter. For example, the lexicographic rule is more decisive than the veto rule, since winning in G 1 is su¢ cient in the former but is only one of two requirements in the latter.
Proposition 3. The following partial order gives the relative decisiveness of the eight rules:
Proof: Relative decisiveness is determined by the inclusion relations among the sets of W cells of the above tables. 7 Shapley (1967) de…ned a committee of a game G as a simple game G 0 with
That is, whenever players of G 0 are crucial to a coalition's success in G, it is because they win in G 0 . In the lexicographic case, for example, G 1 is not a committee because some of its members can produce a win in G by blocking in G 1 even though they do not win in G 1 .
Proposition 4. In the degenerate and product rules both games are committees, in the veto rule only the …rst game is a committee, in the lexicographic rule only the second game is a committee, and in the tally rule neither game is a committee.
Proof:
The lexicographic case will be su¢ cient to show the form of the argument. To show that G 1 is not a committee: since G is LD, G 1 possesses a blocking coalition, say K.
Proposition 5. The lexicographic and product rules are associative, but the degenerate, tally and veto rules are not.
Proof: In the lexicographic case it is required to prove that for
Applying Proposition 2 to the former and expanding the right side of the latter as a union shows that both are identical to
The associativity of the the product follows directly from its de…nition. The tally rule
and similarly for the reversals.
Proposition 6. The tally and product rules are commutative, but the lexicographic, degenerate and veto rules are not.
Proof: Commutativity of an operator is equivalent to symmetry of its table under an exchange of rows and columns.
Proposition 6 states that G 1 ) G 2 and G 2 ) G 1 can be di¤erent, but Proposition 5 implies that G 1 ) G 2 ) ::: ) G n is well-de…ned. The latter is an attractive property since it implies that committee decisions can be sequenced without the complexity of subgroups. The product rule, which is prevalent in actual use, is even simpler because it is both associative and commutative, but it is at the bottom on decisiveness while the lexicographic rule is at the top. These are practical reasons for considering the latter in the appropriate situations.
Section 4. The advantage of being in the …rst component
One criterion for choosing a procedure is how it allocates power. A certain group of players may deserve more power either due to their expertise or their ethical right to make the decision. Other things equal, does the lexicographic procedure grant more power to those in the …rst game or in the second? Having the last word sounds attractive, but the next theorem states that when the two component games are isomorphic and when a player's bene…t is evaluated by any of a broad class of measures, the advantage goes to the …rst group.
The class is the semi-values and de…ning it requires the concept of a game in coalitional function form, in which a function v assigns a real number to each subset of players. (The relation of such games to simple games is straightforward: a simple game's coalitional function assigns 1 to a coalition if it is in G and 0 otherwise; the resulting coalitional function game v corresponds to the simple game G.) A semi-value associates with each v an additive game v (one satisfying
This is equivalent to assigning to each player i the real number v(fig), which can be interpreted as i's bene…t from playing v. A semi-value is a with these four properties:
Symmetry: For any game v and permutation of players, ( v) = ( v). (The game v is de…ned as the one assigning to coalition S the value v( 1 S):)
Monotonicity: If v is monotonic; then v is monotonic:(Monotonicity here requires that for all S S 0 ; v(S) v(S 0 ):)
Theorem 2: Let G 1 and G 2 be isomorphic games with P 1 \ P 2 = ; let f be a bijection from P 1 to P 2 such that b
; and let v be the coalitional function game corresponding to G = (G 1 ) G 2 ): For any semi-value and
Proof: Construct the bijection g :
; where p(#S) is a probability vector (Dubey, Neyman and Weber 1981) 
The Banzhaf score of player i in a game G is de…ned as
Gg; that is, the number of coalitions of players of G that contain i and need i to order to win. The Banzhaf measure is i's Banzhaf score normalized by the number of coalitions containing i, Banz(i; G) = Bsc(i; G)=2 n 1: : It is meant to assess the player's power and its calculation for decomposable games shows why being in the second group makes one weaker.
Proof: For a game H and i 2 P (H); de…ne W (i; H) = fS : i 2 S 2 b Hg and B(i; H) = fS : i 2 S 2 b B(H)g: Then Bsc(i; H) = 2 #W (i; H) # b H (see Dubey and Shapley, 1979) . For G = (G 1 ) G 2 ) and i 2 P 1 ,
Dividing both sides by 2 n 1 +n 2 1 yields Banz(i; G) = Banz(i; G 1 ), the …rst formula of the theorem. For i 2 P 2 ,
Dividing by 2 n 1 +n 2 1 yields the second formula.
The value # b B(G 1 ) can be interpreted as G 1 's lack of decisiveness since it is twice the minimum number of changes required in the game's coalitional function to make it decisive. Then # b B(G 1 )=2 n 1 can be understood as indecisivness normalized according to the size of the game. It is the probability that a blocking coalition forms, if each player is in or out of the coalition independently with probability 1=2. The theorem thus indicates that the Banzhaf measure discounts a player's power for going second and this discounting is greater the more decisive that G 1 is.
Section 5. The smallest LD games
Simple games of a …xed player set are …nite in number, so they can be listed (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Shapley 1962) , and this section gives some of this "descriptive"theory. The counts of small LD games are in Table 6 , whose entries refer to isomorphism classes, i.e., games unique up to permutations of the players. In line with the present de…nition of the player set, games with "dummies"are not included. The …rst column was generated by a computer program available from the …rst-listed author, which produced all possible games with players distinguished and then eliminated isomorphic duplicates in a fairly e¢ cient way. The second column is calculated from Table IV of Loeb and Conway (2000) . The LD games were generated by combining all pairs of smaller component games and eliminating duplicates. For completeness the Table should have a …nal column for games that are LD and anonymous, but in view of Theorem 6 below, it would have the same entries as the decisive and anonymous counts, for n > 1. Table 6 . Numbers of isomorphism classes of games.
The forms of decomposable games for n up to 6 are listed in Table 7 , which shows a weighted quota representation if the game has one, or otherwise gives its minimal winning coalitions, and then gives some selected decompositions. To save space, it lists only those six-player decisive games whose second game involves two or more players. There are 20 further games that have only representations G 1 ) U 1 ; and these can be generated from a consulting a listing of the six-player games (e.g., Muroga et al., 1962) and separating out an arbitrary player, as in Theorem 4 below.
The table uses these further de…nitions: M n;k : the k-of-n majority game: U n : the unanimity game of n players, M n;n . C n : the chief player game of n players (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) , in which a distinguished player plus one other wins (non-decisive.)
A n : the apex game of n players, in which a distinguished "apex"player plus one other wins, and the coalition of all non-apex players wins (decisive.) kjw or kjw 1 w 2 :::w n : the weighted majority game of n players with quota k and weight vector w in which a coalition wins if its total weight is at least the quota.
3-player, decisive (1)
5-player, non-decisive (4) 6j33111 : U 2 ) U 3 6j33211 : U 2 ) C 3 f123; 145; 245; 345g
6-player, non-decisive (19)
f1234; 156; 256; 356; 456g
f123; 1456; 2456; 3456g
6j331111 : U 2 ) M 4;3 f12; 134; 156; 23456g + : 5j3211 ) U 2 8j443111 : U 2 ) C 4 f123; 124; 156; 256; 3456g
8j442111 : U 2 ) 4j2111 f123; 145; 146; 245; 246; 345; 346g + : U 3 ) C 3 6-player, decisive, with #P 2 2 (3) Table 7 . LD games for small n.
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Some games have several decompositions. In some cases one can split a component further, as in 8j442211, and in others one can divide a non-homogeneous player set in di¤erent ways, as in 3j2111. The latter case shows that, unlike game sums and products, there is no unique lexicographic factorization into "prime"games.
Section 6. Conditions for decomposability
Theorem 4. A proper game with a veto player is not LD.
Proof: Assume that G has a veto player v and a decomposition G 1 ) G 2 . Then v 2 P 1 ; otherwise the coalition P 1 could win in G without v. The coalition P 1 fvg blocks in G 1 , since otherwise v would be a dictator, violating the non-triviality requirement P = P 1 [ P 2 . Since (P 1 fvg) [ P 2 blocks in G 1 and wins in G 2 , it wins in G, contradicting the premise that v has a veto.
The next theorem shows that any decisive game of more than one player is LD and that weighted majority games have an especially easy representation.
Theorem 5. Let G be a decisive game with n 2, let i 2 P (G); and let G i be the (n 1)-person game whose minimal winning coalitions are those of G omitting any containing player i. Then G = (G i ) fig  + ) . Let G = kjw be a decisive weighted majority game and let w i be the weight vector w with w i omitted. Then G = (kjw i ) fig  + ) :
Proof. Since G i and kjw i are non-empty, monotonic and proper, the compositions are well-de…ned. Regarding the …rst claim, G being decisive and a coalition blocking in G i imply that it is the player left out of G i who renders the coalition non-blocking in G. Similarly in the second claim, failing to attain the quota k in kjw i means that the dropped player holds the weight that would put the coalition over the quota.
Theorem 6: Given that a proper simple game G is anonymous, it is LD if and only if it is decisive and n 2.
Proof: Given anonymity, it is clear that decisiveness and two or more players imply LD, since G can be expressed G 1 ) U 1 ; with G 1 constructed as in Theorem 5. To show the other direction of implication, assume that G = (G 1 ) G 2 ) is anonymous with n 2 but not decisive, to generate a contradiction. This implies that G 2 is also non-decisive. For i = 1; 2 de…ne w i = minf#S : S 2 G i g and b i = minf#S : S 2 B i g. We proceed in several steps. 1) Let T 1 2 b B 1 and be an automorphism of G.
G 1 such that #S 1 = w 1 , let i 2 S 1 and j 2 P 2 :There exists an automorphism of G such that (i) = j. Since (S 1 ) 2 b G; it follows that w 1 b 1 + w 2 :
3) We now claim that for every k 2 P 2 there exists S 2 2 b G 2 such that k 2 S 2 and #S 2 = w 2 : Let e S 2 2 b G 2 with # e S 2 = w 2 ; e k 2 e S 2 and T 1 2 b
Let be an automorphism of G such that ( e k) = k: By 2),
\ P 2 has all the desired properties. 4) Let, again, S 1 2 b G 1 such that #S 1 = w 1 , let i 2 S 1 and j 2 P 2 : There exists an automorphism of G such that
We distinguish now the following cases: 4a) For some k 2 P 2 ; (k) 2 P 2 : By 3) we may choose S 2 2 b G 2 satisfying #S 2 = w 2 and k 2 S 2 : T 1 [ S 2 2 b G; hence (S 2 ) 2 b G 2 . But this implies that (S 1 ) and (S 2 ) are disjoint winning coalitions of G 2 , a contradiction.
Section 7. Decomposability and equality A central issue of democratic theory is how citizens can participate in their governance in a way that is both equitable and e¢ cient. On considerations of pure democracy every issue should be debated by everyone, but limitations of time mean that most decisions are assigned to elected leaders or bureaucrats. Lexicographic systems can save time since they often bypass some of the players, and this section discusses whether they can be designed to be equitable as well. The mathematical interpretation of equitability will be anonymity, that all players have the same role in the game. This is very strict criterion and weaker ones like assigning equal power according to some measure would be easier to satisfy. Note that "equitable" is generally di¤erent than "fair", since certain parties sometimes have a right to a special role, so this analysis would be relevant only when parties were considered a priori equal.
The problem is to …nd games that are both LD and anonymous. One method starts with two anonymous games, one of them decisive and the other LD, and forms a single LD anonymous game. Composition by the quotient method is de…ned as follows. Let G be a game with P (G) = f1; :::ng and let H i ; i = 1; :::n; be games with disjoint player sets. The composition game using quotient G and components H i is G[H 1 ; :::H n ] where Shapley, 1967) . A coalition wins in the large game if it wins in a winning set of component games, as if the latter were individual players.
Proposition 7: Let G be LD and representable as (G 1 ) G 2 ); with P (G) = f1; :::ng, P (G 1 ) = f1; :::kg and P (G 2 ) = fk + 1; :::ng: If H i ; i 2 P (G); are decisive games with disjoint player sets then G[H 1 ; ::: 
Conversely, let S 2 G 1 [H 1 ; :::
(Here we use the assumption that H 1 ; :::H n are decisive.) As
For the second claim, which was noted by Loeb and Conway (2000, 401) , let f ij be an isomorphism between H i and H j . For every 1 ; 2 , automorphisms of G and H 1 respectively, we de…ne = ( 1 ; 2 ) : [
As is an automorphism of G[H 1 ; :::H n ] that game is transitive.
A simple application of this proposition takes the quotient as M 3;2 , which has the decomposition M 3;2 = (U 2 ) U 1 ), and also uses M 3;2 as component games. This produces the identity M 3;2 [M 3;2 ; M 3;2 ; M 3;2 ] = (U 2 [M 3;2 ; M 3;2 ] ) M 3;2 ); which can be seen either as three subcommittees voting simultaneously or as two voting and the third committee resolving ties. By construction not only is the composition game anonymous but so are the two lexicographic components.
Another way to …nd decompositions of anonymous games is to start with any decisive anonymous game and decompose it. (Theorem 6 states that decisiveness is necessary and su¢ cient in this context.) There are many such starting games and for the special interest of their simplicity we look at only those that are not only anonymous themselves but yield anonymous components. The simplest examples are decisive majority games, so that M 7;4 = (M 6;4 ) U 1 ) for example. Another instance involves the 7-player Fano game of Figure 2 (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) . Deleting the point in the center of the triangle produces a structure equivalent to the six-person Octahedral Game Oct 6 ; de…ned as the game with players at the vertices and with minimal winning coalitions as the four faces shaded in the …gure. The latter game is proper since every pair of shaded faces intersect, and it is clearly anonymous. Thus F ano 7 = (Oct 6 ) U 1 ): The operation can also be understood from the opposite direction, as a composition starting with Oct 6 and adding a seventh player in the middle of the octahedron, who wins by combining with any two diagonally opposite players. Since the diagonally opposite pairs are the only minimal blocking coalitions of Oct 6 the new game is decisive, and itcan be veri…ed to be the Fano game.
A third such example starts with the game whose players lie at the vertices of a pentagon and whose minimal winning coalitions are any three in a row. It can be called P ent 5 . It is not decisive, since two non-adjacent players can block. Adding a sixth player who wins in combination with any of the blocking pairs generates f123; 234; 345; 145; 125; 136; 146; 246; 256; 356g + . This is an interesting game …rst identi…ed by Gurk and Isbell (1959) as the unique smallest game that is anonymous and decisive with an even number of players. A representation that brings out its anonymous character was o¤ered by Zvonkin (reported by Loeb and Conway, 2000) who put the 6 players at the 12 vertices of a icosahedron with diagonally opposite vertices assigned to the same player and de…ned the minimal winning coalitions as any three players on the same (triangular) face. Accordingly it can be called the six-player icosahedral game Icos 6 , and we have Icos 6 = (P ent 5 ) U 1 ): A larger example involves the game based on the 11-point Steiner system St(4; 5; 11), which is unique for its parameters. It has 11 players, 66 minimal winning coalitions of 5 players each with the property that any 4-tuple or players appears exactly once. It decomposes as St(4; 5; 11) = (G 1 ) U 1 ) where G 1 has minimal winning coalitions based on a 10-player design: 36 sets of 5 players each in which each triple of players appears exactly three times.
Anonymous decisive games like these, that decompose as G 1 ) U 1 with G 1 anonymous, are relatively few because their automorphism group must satisfy a restrictive property. A game is said to be k -transitive if for any two ordered k-tuples of players there exists an automorphism carrying the …rst k-tuple into the second. Clearly, for k 2 k-transitivity implies (k 1)-transitivity, and 1-transitivity is just anonymity. According to the proposition below the operation described here requires at least 2-transitivity, since separating a player from a game that is not 2-transitive, like P ent 5 , distinguishes some of the players left behind and the …rst component will not be anonymous.
Proposition 8. Let G be an anonymous proper game that is LD as G 1 ) U 1 . Then G 1 is anonymous if and only if G is 2-transitive.
Proof: Let G's automorphism group be ( ; f1; :::ng), where are permutations that act on the player set f1; :::ng: This has a subgroup (f 2 : (n) = ng; f1; :::ng), and the group ( 1 ; f1; :::n 1g); de…ned as the latter's restriction to f1; :::n 1g will be G 1 's automorphism group. The theorem is true if the following holds (where transitivity has the obvious meaning applied to groups rather than games): if is 1-transitive then 1 is 1-transitive if and only if is also 2-transitive. The forward direction of the implication was shown by Ledermann (1973) . To show the backward direction note that the 2-transitivity of G implies that any pair (i; n) and (j; n) both lie in some orbit, which implies G 0 1 s anonymity.
An enumeration of small anonymous decisive games (Loeb and Conway, 2000) shows how constraining 2-transitivity is. For n = 1 to 12 there are 57,317 types of such games up to isomorphism but only 11 of them are 2-transitive. They are the six simple majority games with odd numbers of players, as well as the three games just discussed -the Icosahedral, Fano and Steiner quadruple system games -and …nally two 10-player games, each of which has two non-isomorphic kinds of winning coalitions and so is more complicated than the previous ones. Thus the search yields a few interesting types but stipulating that the components be anonymouse is quite restrictive. Section 8. Lexicographic composition with deference.
A lexicographic system can give more relative power to some parties, which is justi…able when they are experts or they have a normative claim to be making the decision. For example, expertise and legitimacy are both signi…cant in the design of arbitration procedures, since the principal parties should know better what is good for them and they have a special right to make a decision about their lives. In the US presidential case ties in the Electoral College are broken by the House of Representatives. While the power indices for the combination of the two bodies do not seem to have appeared in the literature, it seems likely in light of Section 4 that the former body has far more power from possessing the …rst move and having a decisive rule. The arrangement plausibly re ‡ects a greater right of the Electoral College to choose a president because it was selected by the citizenry just for that purpose.
The way to confer more power is to put a group in the …rst position and make that game relatively decisive. There is an irony in this, however: suppose the …rst game requires a 2/3 majority, and that a coalition achieves only 60% of the …rst group and blocks in the second. Even though the …rst group has expressed a preference this fact is discarded and the result is left undecided. If the …rst group has a special claim to decide, then the rules should give them some degree of deference after a block in the second group. A system that includes such deference was used at the 1984 Pan-American Games (Shapley, n.d.) . The New York Times reported that an American boxer was "grim and ba-ed"about why he had lost the match (Litsky 1984) . The rules used were: a main panel of …ve expert judges sat at ringside and voted for one …ghter or the other. A 5-0 or 4-1 vote settled it but a 3-2 split sent the matter to another …ve-person panel where a majority of 5-0 or 4-1 settled it. However a 3-2 split in either direction in the back up panel gave the match to whichever …ghter had won 3-2 in the …rst panel.
This kind of rule can be de…ned using the lexicographic operator. A game of lexicographic composition with deference is de…ned as a proper simple game expressible as ;3 where the superscripts specify the player sets, P 1 = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g being the …rst set of judges and P 2 = f6; 7; 8; 9; 10g the backup.
The following proposition indicates another way of expressing such games. Its proof is straightforward.
Proposition 9: If G is a game of lexicographic composition with deference, representable as G 1 ) G 2 ) G 
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The deference construction was meant to generate anonymity. In the boxing rules the …rst group has 68% of the power, according to the Shapley-Shubik index. The method was designed for contexts where fairness requires inequality, but we can still ask whether such rules can be anonymous. Indeed one example are:U ; which is M 7;4 . (The player sets are f1; 2; 3g and f4; 5g in the former, and f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and f6; 7g in the latter.) These two representations are instances of a general rule stated in the next proposition. A decisive majority game M n is de…ned as one with an odd number n of players and winning coalitions of size (n + 1)=2. Such a game can be decomposed as lexicographic sequences with deference, but the particular way noted involves separating only two players.
Proposition 10. For n 5 and odd, M n = (M 1 n 2;(n+1)=2 ) U 2 2 ) M 1 n 2 ); where P 1 = f1; 2; ::: n 2g and P 2 = fn 1; ng:
Proof. The right hand side has three types of minimal winning coalitions: n 2 C (n+1)=2 coalitions of (n + 1)=2 players of P 1 , who win in the …rst component; n 2 C (n 1)=2 coalitions of (n 1)=2 players of P 1 who block in the …rst component and 2 players from P 2 who win in the second; 2 n C (n 1)=2 coalitions of (n 1)=2 players of P 1 who block in the …rst component and win in the third, and 1 player in P 2 who blocks in the second. The three groups are disjoint and their numbers sum to n C (n+1)=2 , which is the number of distinct coalitions of size (n + 1)=2;which de…ne the simple majority game.
Many real decision systems are vaguely like this in that they are "almost" lexicographic. Even when the …rst group is blocked its views are not completely discarded. Under …nal o¤er arbitration a negotiation failure sends the decision to an arbitrator who must choose between only two outcomes, those nominated by each negotiator. In the US presidential system, the House of Representatives must choose from the three candidates who received the highest votes in the Electoral College. Often higher courts have to take the factual judgements of lower courts as given and can reverse them only for legal error. These systems favor the …rst group by letting it limit the range of choice, but since this goes beyond the dichotomy of outcomes of simple games, they are more readily modeled in the extensive form (e.g., Moulin 1983) .
